NYU Economics John Lazarev


John Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
New York University


Curriculum Vitae [PDF]

Contact Information

Email:
Office:
Phone:
jlazarev@nyu.edu
19 W 4th St, Office 827, New York, NY 10012
(212) 998-3891


Working Papers

  • The Welfare Effects of Intertemporal Price Discrimination: An Empirical Analysis of Airline Pricing in U.S. Monopoly Markets, revise and resubmit at the American Economic Review [PDF]

    This paper studies how a firm's ability to price discriminate over time affects production, product quality, and the product allocation among consumers. The theoretical model has forward-looking and heterogeneous consumers who face a monopoly firm. The firm can affect the quality and quantity of the goods sold each period. I show that the welfare effects of intertemporal price discrimination are parameter-dependent. I use this model to study the time paths of prices for airline tickets offered on monopoly routes in the U.S. Using estimates of the model's demand and cost parameters, I compare the welfare travelers receive under the current ticketing system to several alternative systems, including one in which there is free resale of airline tickets.


  • Simulating the Dynamic Effects of Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines, with Lanier Benkard and Aaron Bodoh-Creed, under revision [PDF]

  • Getting More from Less: Understanding Airline Pricing, under review [PDF] [Slides].

    Motivated by pricing practices in the airline industry, the paper studies the incentives of players to publicly and independently limit the sets of actions they can play later in a game. I find that to benefit from self-restraint, players have to exclude all actions that create temptations to deviate and keep some actions that can deter deviations of others. I develop a set of conditions under which these strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium and show that in a Bertrand oligopoly, firms can mutually gain from self-restraint, while in a Cournot oligopoly they cannot.

  • The Identification Power of the Markov Assumption in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models, under review [Slides]

    This paper studies the identification power of the Markov assumption in dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity. Based on the fact that a mixture of Markov processes violates the Markov property, I propose a test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and show how to recover individual policy functions from a mixture of Markov processes. This result extends the set of dynamic discrete choice models to which the two-step estimator of Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) can be applied.


Work in Progress

  • Input Allocation and Downstream Market Structure: Slot Control in the U.S. Airline Industry, coming soon


  • Quantifying Delay Externalities in Airline Networks, with Liyu Dou and Jakub Kastl, coming soon


  • Most Favored Nation Clauses in the Health Care Industry, with Cory Capps and Ali Yurukoglu, coming soon


  • How Airlines Compete: Evidence from Airfare Hikes

    Since January 2011, U.S. airlines have attempted to increase fares on domestic markets twenty times. Nine times they were successful. Eleven times some airlines did not follow along. As a result, the other carriers rolled the fares back. This paper studies the mechanism of fare hikes in the U.S. airline industry using a high frequency dataset on time paths of prices collected from domestic airline markets.

  • A Maximum Likelihood Estimator in an Incomplete Model of English Auctions

    Haile and Tamer (2003) proposed an incomplete model of English auctions based on two assumptions: (i) bidders never bid more than their valuations; (ii) bidders never let an opponent win at a price below their valuations. They used these assumptions separately to construct estimators of two bounds that can be placed on the distribution of bidders’ valuations. In contrast, I show how to use both assumptions simultaneously to construct an estimator that is more efficient than previously proposed.